I've re-read your last posts a couple of times and I'm confused.
At first I thought you were trying to say that TKD was the descendant of some kid-friendly Japanese MA or maybe that the term 'block' was used as a euphemism to make MAs seem more peaceful. This last post certainly implies that TKD is a deadly serious MA.
It's both, K (in much the same way as Karate is), but the history is a little complex. Itosu' karate was diluted specifically for kids, but the karate that Funakoshi taught in Japan incorporated that same dilution, partly because of the kihon-based methods that GF had to develop for mass instruction, and partly because of the reluctance, discussed at length in Gennosuke Higaki's excellent book
Hidden Karate: the True Bunkai for the Pinan Katas and Naihanchi, of the Okinawan expats to teach the Japanese the deeper applications. Higaki's own instructor, Shozan Kubota, studied privately with GF as well as taking his university classes in karate, and GF kept slipping up and showing him stuff about applications that, as he said, he wasn't
supposed to be telling him. Simon O'Neil (SJON on MT) has a nice outline of the background knowledge of the first generations of karate students, both Japanese and Korean, in his own book
The Taegeuk Cipher, and it's clear that there was a
progressive diminution in combat knowledge of karate applications over several generations, in the direction of Itosu's children's-karate version.
The original kwan founders, with the exception of Hwang Kee, all got their MA training in Japan under karate instructors. They studied in the thirties, during the first 'dilution' stage, so some of the more combat-oriented techniques were trained. My own suspicion is that they ramped up that aspect in response to the absolutely chaotic conditions in Korea in the last days of the Occupation and in the immediate post-Occupation era—and so, when the Korean War broke out, the fact that Gen. Choi had been one of the first-generation kwan pioneers
and a high-ranking military officer, and had himself gone to Japan to learn karate
with the specific intention of using it to defend himself, meant that karate started life in Korea under much more combat realistic intentions than in Japan, where it was viewed as just a kind of martial calisthenics and physical indoctrination in group discipline. The military dimension of TKD set it apart from all other empty-handed TMAs—and it makes sense, eh?, for a population whose access to weapons had been suppressed, on pain of severe punishment, for at least half a century, to think of their empty handed fighting technique in a very different way, a much more urgent way, than the Japanese would.
The problem is that Itosu's original model was always there for anyone who wanted to dilute the combat content of TKD still further, and that's what happened in Korea when the military government and, especially, the Korean CIA began to repackage TKD by first enforcing—by imprisonment, kidnapping, and murder—homogenization of the kwans, and then recruiting one of the KCIA's senior agents, Un-young Kim, to transform TKD into a martial, ultimately Olympic sport, as part of an overall program of the ROK's Cold War confrontation with the North and the protection of the Park regime's horrible human rights record—right up there with Stalin's (or, for that matter, the North's) from scrutiny. The latter story is documented in Alex Gillis' brilliant book
A Killing Art: the Untold History of Taekwondo, the most heavily documented history of any MA I've ever come across. So both are true: Itosu's camouflaged civilian fighting techiques were taught in diluted form in Japan, but taken by the first generation of modern Korean MAists back to Korea where it was turned into a 'killing art' by practitioners like Choi and Nam Tae-hi, and then defanged and deprived of blood by the infinitely corrupt, deceitful and ambitious KCIA-agent turned sport entrepreneur UYK.
BTW, I was told by a friend who was in Vietnam that he always liked being around Korean compounds there since there was virtually zero enemy activity in their vicinity.
The VC field command specifically ordered their fighters to avoid Korean troops unless they had overwhelming numerical superiority (and even then, it didn't help, as at Tra Binh Dong, where the Koreans were outnumbered something like 5 to one and still managed to inflict catastrophic damage on the communist forces, with relatively light casualties to themselves, fighting hand-to-hand in smoke-filled trenches); Stuart Anslow's book reproduces the documentation for that directive. Whatever you might think of the VC, they weren't stupid...