Col. Tunnell's letter is essential reading for Americans trying to understand why we are 11 years into a war against an illiterate enemy that has no air force, navy, or armor.
COIN cost U.S. war effort
Where did we go wrong? Tunnell said it's mainly because our senior leaders, who have less combat maneuver experience now than perhaps at any time in U.S. military history, are "unwilling to conduct operations that reflect sound military art and science."
Years ago, we abandoned our counterterrorism efforts in favor of counterinsurgency (COIN), a nebulous, and primarily political strategy aimed at protecting populations and addressing grievances. Killing the enemy and breaking their will to fight becomes secondary, and success hinges on an incredibly corrupt Afghan government.
Tunnell says that COIN "consists of musings from amateurs, contractors, plagiarized journal articles, etc." and has contributed to "needless American casualties":
COIN has become such a restrictive dogma that it cannot be questioned; any professional discussion about its strengths and weaknesses is discouraged. It has reached such a crisis that those who employ other Army doctrinal concepts do so at their own professional peril because they will be subject to censure for not adhering to COIN. This has created a dysfunctional and toxic leadership environment throughout our Army which has resulted in poor organization, unrealistic training, and indecisive battlefield performance.
Our military exists to protect American citizens, not Afghans. And if the Afghan people have grievances, that is their business – not ours. Our business should be to kill the terrorists that seek to kill Americans and then come home. The moment we quit doing that was the moment we abandoned our own best interests:
Our potential for greater coalition casualties does not have to be inevitable, but due to our flawed approach to operations we wind up enabling our enemy. The population-centric approach which places the population as the center of gravity is applied to the point of absurdity. The enemy is entrenching himself among the civilian population as we cede to him territory and lines of communication. […]
A gross lack of concern for subordinates manifests in guidance that "zero" civilian casualties are acceptable and coalition soldiers may have to be killed rather than defend themselves against a potential threat and risk being wrong and possibly resulting in injury or death of civilians...