accusations against the MIC
It seems that to explore the MIC adequately we must consider those characteristics of the complex that most of its critics ascribe to it. To do this we must deal with the idea of conspiracy, the element of secrecy, the subject of preparation as confrontation, the level of defense spending, war profiteering, military retirees in industry, the size of the complex, the lack of control over it, and the evaluation of the MIC as “institutionally rigid.”
Conspiracy. American history is replete with the writings of many who see conspiracy at every turn. Richard Hofstadter, in his Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965), used the phrase “paranoid style” in describing the grand theories of conspiracy of those persons who have obvious feelings of persecution. The perception of the person evidencing this approach to life sees an amorphous group of agents who have a design upon the resources of the land and its people. The paranoid stylist sees his role as being unselfish and full of deep patriotism, quite righteous, and morally indignant. The rhetoric of the conspiracy claimants has been labeled for what it is. No evidence has been produced to substantiate a de facto conspiracy. To label as “conspiracy” a concern about national security says more about the perceptions of the accuser than it does about the situation. Honest differences amongst all elements of the MIC are as varied as the general population. People connected with the complex are among the strongest advocates of détente, SALT, and a smaller voluntary military.
Secrecy. The question of secrecy looms large to many when matters of a military nature are discussed, and perhaps it will loom even larger as a result of present domestic problems in government. Since those outside the complex do not possess information and often question the credibility of information provided by the military or the government, questions are raised as to the validity of considered threats. The secrecy game is insidious because it can be used so simplistically as to invalidate any discussion. Critics will have to decide how valid the annual posture statements of the Secretary of Defense are. There are very few areas that are not available for public discussion. Size of forces, amounts of arms, contractual developments, and relative strengths are in the public domain. Internal efforts within the Department of Defense evidence not only awareness of this concern but positive steps to raise the level of public understanding and discussion. The broad accusation of a conspiracy of silence and secrecy can be substantiated in some few situations but cannot be supported as a blanket accusation.
Confrontation. Often the claim is made that military preparation leads necessarily to confrontation, that a force in readiness is a force anxious to exercise its war muscles. It seems that certain elements feel that they are the only ones who want a state of peace. Is there not a legitimate place in the world for a maintenance of peace? The notion of a complete trust system, wherein one can accept in faith the idea that a state system or even an international system can bring peace and a cessation of hostility, does not equate with any picture of man in either modern ethical systems or ancient ones. Biblical understanding of man usually places man in two worlds (often pictured, as in the language of Augustine, as two cities): the city of God, founded on love and trust of God and our fellowman, and its earthly opposite, the city of Man, founded symbolically by Cain. Cain’s city always has with it some aspect of the venom of his original fratricide. God’s city is a trust system; man’s city a distrust system. There is ample history to substantiate the latter. The logical corollary for a system designed to maintain peace and deter aggression is the vocation of military service. Can reason suggest that the role of government is to withdraw from the protection of its people? All forms of power, whether sexual, economic, political, or military, have potential for misuse. But to isolate one form of power without relating it to its function and its need in an imperfect world seems less than responsible.
Defense spending. Another rather obvious fiction is the concern voiced by many that the defense budget has loose purse strings and a runaway percentage of the economy. The claim has been made that it has less control and less scrutiny than other programs emanating from Washington. This myth is just not true in fact or practice, past or present. The defense budget receives more scrutiny, not less. Systems analysis, planning, programming and budgeting systems, and other tools of cost analysis have been applied more in the Department of Defense than in any other government activity. The number of military personnel has been decreased from 3,547,000 in 1968 to 2,199,000 in 1974, and the defense budget from 12 percent of the gross national product in 1954 to 5.9 percent in 1973.
Furthermore, one’s consideration of cost must relate it to the total American economy. Complexes surrounding education, medicine, farm products, transportation, etc., derive their support from several levels of government (state, county, and municipal), whereas the military budget is drawn totally from the federal coffer. The subject of our national commitments and our national responsibility to the world at large needs balanced study before the United States exits from the international arena. Recent struggles in the Near East and the accompanying energy crisis reinforce the significant global role of the United States today.
War profiteering. Accompanying the controversy over the runaway defense budget was the contention, always renewed in America during and after wars, of the making of enormous war profits. A spiraling inflation, together with the high cost of sophisticated weaponry and the ever increasing cost overruns, easily substantiated the general distrust of an anguished and long-suffering nation. The popular image presented in numerous volumes and articles on war profiteering was finally put to rest with more extensive audits by the General Accounting Office in the Defense Industry Profits Study of March 1971. The study shows, among other things, that thirty-two large defense contractors selected at random who did more than ten percent of their total business with DOD made basically the same profit as thirteen contractors, also randomly selected, who did less than ten percent of their business with DOD.
Military retirees in industry. A corollary to the profiteering myth is the idea that the number of retired military participating in second careers with war-making industries is excessive or, even worse, is another symptom of the evils of the MIC. Calculations drawn from a study made by Senator William Proxmire indicated that only eight percent of the officers, colonel through general, were employed by the 100 largest defense industries. Even high estimates place only forty percent of all retired military in the defense and aerospace sector of the economy. It hardly seems wrong or a necessary evil to expect persons with specific skills and developed vocational roles to pursue a second career in an area where they have background and experience. When questions of proportionality, level of entry, and diversification of employment are thoroughly analyzed, the evidence gives very little that is conclusive. Early fears in this area, inflamed by rhetoric and exaggeration, have subsided with each new study.
Size of MIG. If the former fictions and exaggerations are accepted, there still needs to be some consideration given to the problem implicit in any core of interest as large and powerful as that associated with the MIC, but these concerns and implications could well be leveled against any other big complex. To isolate them as an evil in one area without relating to all structures is an argumentum ad hominem and adds little to thoughtful discourse.
Lack of control. Critics frequently point out that the concern for national security which unites military, industrial, and governmental security planners lacks any kind of countervailing force in the social order. This seems to neglect the fact that there are numerous and strong countervailences within the complex. Not only do we find a variety of views within the military itself but also we find independent groups within government (Senate, House of Representatives, National Security Council, etc.) and outside government (RAND Corporation, Brookings Institution), all of which have had impact in trying to keep expenditures down, reduce procurement, and develop decision-making processes for a time of restraint. Again, it is important to note that systems analysis, planning-programming-budgeting systems, as well as other means of relating costs to effectiveness, have been pioneered in government by the Department of Defense. Would that other complexes were able to make judgments in social and educational areas as effectively.
Rigidity. Finally, the general accusation is frequently made that the MIC is institutionally rigid. Those who delight in this argument stereotype the military and those associated with it. The discipline of order, regulation, and institutional commitment are symptoms that impede innovation or adaptation. To validate this argument, a critic would have to be aware of the process of change occurring within all facets of the MIC. It seems difficult for persons within the structures to comprehend fully all the changes taking place. To draw a fair comparison, one would have to make a study relating the degree of changes among several complexes, such as the teaching-administration-education complex, the physician-medicine-hospital complex, and other similar interlocking structures. It is very difficult to justify the generality that members of the MIC are any more conservative institutionally than administrators, doctors, teachers, etc.
the facts to be known
Modern technology has had enormous impact on the defense scene. The requirement to understand the complexities of the management of a continuous flow of new systems has created an entirely new atmosphere for the men and women who manage, operate, and maintain current systems. It certainly is not an atmosphere that lacks change. Thus the changing scene has thrust upon persons within the military—and in the MIC as well—the need to be adaptive as well as innovative. The static scene of a “Beetle Bailey” environment is an anachronism in the light of change. The very nature of the demands has a significant influence on the person selected, the kinds of peers he competes with, the continuous education he receives, and the advancement that comes to a person of ability. It is obvious to persons inside and outside the MIC that change in the complex is integral to its life at this stage in history. A maginot-line mentality is a guarantee of failure for the military as well as industrial support systems.
It seems to me that the time is more than past for persons of good will to stop scapegoating the MIC and start affirming the fact that our nation needs and demands cooperation among technology, management, industry, government, and the military to solve the problems of security and deterrence. There is not a MIC conspiracy; arguments as to secrecy have been exaggerated, and public information is available to the seeker; preparation is responsible and does not necessitate confrontation; spending is under control; profiteering is grossly exaggerated; countervailing forces do exist; and the labeling of the MIC as institutionally rigid is not accurate.
Our nation deserves the best from all its people. We need to assess myths, fictions, inaccuracies, proper proportions, facts, and realities of all segments of life, including the military-industrial complex. We need to examine our dreams and fantasies and know them for what they are. There is plenty of room for discussion and honest difference of opinion to choose among national priorities and concerns. There is not room for responsible persons of good will to dismiss the need for the MIC, to disregard the nature of men and nations, and to distrust a team effort whose service to the nation has been demonstrated in every period of our history.
