Gettysburg: Assault on the Round Tops....Should they have gone to the right?

[Bob Hubbard]

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out resembling a fishhook. Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. Confederate generals including Longstreet had wanted to attack by flanking the Union forces and hitting them from the side and behind. Lee overruled this plan and insisted on a frontal assault, which was unsuccessful at the cost of heavy casualties on both sides.

Should Lee have listened to his generals and gone with the flanking attack they had wanted?

 

[Bob Hubbard]

Map

 

[Steel Tiger]

I am certainly of the opinion that Lee should have gone around the flank. Considering how heavily entrenched the Union forces were becoming, a flanking maneuver would have caused chaos as they attempted to re-deploy to deal with it.

I get the distinct impression that Lee was not exactly sure of the terrain through the Devil's Den, Peach Orchard and the slopes of the Round Tops and that seems uncharacteristic. Then again a lot of what Lee did at Gettysburg seems very uncharacteristic to me. It was like he was in a hurry to join battle and was not thinking clearly.

 

[Bob Hubbard]

That is what I've read as well. His hand was forced in part from the actions on the first day, and he seemed hesitant to pull the army back knowing the enemy was in front of him. Some have suggested that Lee was sick as well, and that may have clouded his judgment, leading to the irony of the third day where he ended up with a reverse Fredricksburg.

 

[Steel Tiger]

The fact that his usual source of intelligence, General Stuart, was nowhere to be found may have been a contributing factor to his mental unease.

 

[Blotan Hunka]

On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out resembling a fishhook. Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. Confederate generals including Longstreet had wanted to attack by flanking the Union forces and hitting them from the side and behind. Lee overruled this plan and insisted on a frontal assault, which was unsuccessful at the cost of heavy casualties on both sides.

Should Lee have listened to his generals and gone with the flanking attack they had wanted?

This guy has an interesting thought on the matter. But Im unclear on the question here. A.P. Hill and Ewell did attempt a flank on the Union right. The little round top assault WAS a flank attack. Pickets charge on day 3 was a frontal assault. Im unclear on the question here.

The flank attack on the Union left would have been a master stroke but for faulty intell. Longstreet ran into Sickles III corps and that ****ed up the whole plan.

http://towergames.com/tg/articles/flanking_at_Gettysburg.jsp

After stepping off from the Bushman Woods and crossing over a short lane which we now know as South Confederate Avenue, the brigade started up the heavily forested southwestern slope of Little Round Top (LRT). As they got into the trees, Law detached the 47th and 44th from the extreme right side of the brigade line and had them countermarch behind the brigade and assume new positions well to the left of the 4th Alabama.
Depending on whom you believe, this detachment occured either (1) because the 47th and 44th were encountering especially rugged wooded terrain that threatened to break up their unit congruity; or (2) because there was a call for Robertson's Brigade (Texans), probing near Devil's Den, to be reinforced.
Robertson, and Benning's Brigade (Georgians) to his immediate left, had encountered heavy Union resistance as they climbed the ridge behind the Triangular Field, and then nearly came apart with the counterattack of the 124th New York ("Orange Blossoms") across that same field. This was about the time that Hood was wounded and division command passed to Law. It's not impossible that Law learned of the threat and passed along his two far-right regiments to bolster Robertson. According to his post-war writings, Hood claimed that his intent was to move Law up into the woods of LRT, out of sight of the 4th Maine and other Union defenders at Devil's Den, and then to sweep down upon them across the Plum Run valley and take them in flank. It was never foreseen to achieve the apex of LRT and then clamber down onto the Taneytown Road into the Federal reserve.
Post-war revisionists fixated on the effect such a move might have made on the Union "fishhook", although they ignored the fact that much of Sykes' Fifth Corps and all of Sedgwick's Sixth Corps were held in the Union reserve, and might easily have been marched to stop the Union army from being rolled up. Even though Law and Hood (and especially Law and Longstreet) had clashed over tactical matters in the past, it appears that Law was still sticking to Hood's plan, even though he was shorting the flanking force by two full regiments. Of course, no one expected Vincent's Brigade (incl. 20th Maine) to be in a defensive position on the southern slope of LRT. In fact, Law expected no resistance as his right-most regiments climbed the hill. Oates and the 15th Alabama were surprised by the first volleys from the 83rd Pennsylvania and 20th Maine...then got into the spirit of the fight, as countless historians have described ad nauseum.

So, if Law had not stripped two regiments off his brigade front, what would've happened? As we all know, Chamberlain was hard-pressed to keep a defensive position against the 15th and 48th Alabama, even having to refuse his left flank at one point. If the 48th and 44th Alabama had comprised the far right of Law's line, there is little doubt that the 20th Maine would've been flanked and routed. Certainly, there wouldn't have been any last-ditch heroic bayonet charge. But, in the end, would it have even mattered?

 

[Bob Hubbard]

I've also read that Pickett's Charge was supposed to be a combined assault, but the calvary attacks in the Union rear were a failure, and the Confederate Left Flank failed to attack in any manner that would have supported the main center thrust. That said, it came damn close to cracking the Union lines, but didn't have the follow up punch needed to take advantage of the initial openings and was repulsed.

 

[Hand Sword]

From all of my readings, on the first day, Lee had said to take that hill (round top) if it was found to be prudent. It was Jackson's division, and they did not, inspite of urging by commanders to do so. Professors have explained that Robert E. lee didn't like to bark orders at his people. Had he done so, or if Stonewall had lived, that vacant hill would've been taken, had artillery placed on it, and chaged the outcome. Pickett's charge with cannons firing down on the fishhook, like fish in a barrel, would've been interesting.

That being said, to answer the question, yes, they should've swung the army around and flanked the Union army.

 

[Steel Tiger]

I've also read that Pickett's Charge was supposed to be a combined assault, but the calvary attacks in the Union rear were a failure, and the Confederate Left Flank failed to attack in any manner that would have supported the main center thrust. That said, it came damn close to cracking the Union lines, but didn't have the follow up punch needed to take advantage of the initial openings and was repulsed.

And given the distance (over a mile) that the Confederate forces had to maintain to stay safe from artillery fire, Pickett was never going to get any support for a follow up before the Federal troops had been significantly reinforced.

The Confederate left flank has always been an interesting thing. It is generally dismissed in evaluations of the battle because it was supposedly facing the largest concentration of Federal troops. The film Gettysburg paints an interesting picture of General Ewell who was commanding the left as a man unwilling to attack the enemy positions. This is not what I understand Ewell was actually like. But there does seem to have been a failure of the left to participate in Pickett's assault. Maybe his uncharacteristic timidity resulted from having to attack a fortified enemy, something he was not accustomed to.

 

[Hand Sword]

Checking the annals of my memory (it's been awhile) I believe the left side was cut off, and pinned down during the charge when the Union army meneuvered in a way to get triangular fire on the Confederates. I don't believe their terrain was as flat and open as the rest of the group.

 

[Steel Tiger]

Checking the annals of my memory (it's been awhile) I believe the left side was cut off, and pinned down during the charge when the Union army meneuvered in a way to get triangular fire on the Confederates. I don't believe their terrain was as flat and open as the rest of the group.

That's interesting. I had not read anything about the left's terrain before, except that they faced two hills or ridges.

 

[Hand Sword]

The fact that his usual source of intelligence, General Stuart, was nowhere to be found may have been a contributing factor to his mental unease.

Very true. In fact it was a huge factor. Lee was in unfamiliar territory, and had no idea of the size of the force that was in front of him. He let Stuart know about it after also.

Funny thing the whole thing started off as a search for some shoes and supplies. The south came in from the north, and the north came in from the south. Two small forces just ran into each other, started having it out, and with everyone hearing shots or news of fighting, joined in too. Kind of like you give permission for a friend to bring a few friends by for your party. Next thing you know, your small get together is a huge BASH!

 

[Steel Tiger]

Very true. In fact it was a huge factor. Lee was in unfamiliar territory, and had no idea of the size of the force that was in front of him. He let Stuart know about it after also.

Funny thing the whole thing started off as a search for some shoes and supplies. The south came in from the north, and the north came in from the south. Two small forces just ran into each other, started having it out, and with everyone hearing shots or news of fighting, joined in too. Kind of like you give permission for a friend to bring a few friends by for your party. Next thing you know, your small get together is a huge BASH!

Intelligence is the thing isn't it? A better picture of the ground to the south of the town may have lead Lee be more imperative about taking the Big Round Top.

 

[Hand Sword]

In his way he kind of did. As I said, he didn't really demand things from his commanders. It wasn't his personality. Common sense should have had those hills taken at the time. They were practically empty, and could've been taken easily by a handful. High ground should always be taken if possible. Here it was handed to the confederates and refused. It just wasn't found to be "practical" at the time to take it. The next day many good confederates died trying to take the hill that should have been theirs to begin with.

Intelligence? Yes! Very important. Fate? Just as important. Jackson had died a few weeks earlier from pneumonia. If he had led his division still, at that point, Hills taken, and then some! Jeb Stuart? Never behaved like that previously, or after. Longstreet? Failed to attack on the time needed, for the first and last time. A lot of variables involved.

 

[Steel Tiger]

In his way he kind of did. As I said, he didn't really demand things from his commanders. It wasn't his personality. Common sense should have had those hills taken at the time. They were practically empty, and could've been taken easily by a handful. High ground should always be taken if possible. Here it was handed to the confederates and refused. It just wasn't found to be "practical" at the time to take it. The next day many good confederates died trying to take the hill that should have been theirs to begin with.

Intelligence? Yes! Very important. Fate? Just as important. Jackson had died a few weeks earlier from pneumonia. If he had led his division still, at that point, Hills taken, and then some! Jeb Stuart? Never behaved like that previously, or after. Longstreet? Failed to attack on the time needed, for the first and last time. A lot of variables involved.

The loss of Jackson was an extremely telling blow to Lee's army. But it is strange how so many of the Confederate commanders behaved in uncharacteristic ways at Gettysburg. There was a surprising amount of over cautious command at the battle.

 

[Hand Sword]

It was strange indeed. The first day, with the exception of the taking the hills thing, went very well for the Confederates actually. They were in fact aggressive and drove the Union army out of their positions. In my opinion, it all hinged on the Hill issue, which was, at the time, not known to be of importance, until after the fact.


Hind sight is a great thing isn't it?

 

[Steel Tiger]

It was strange indeed. The first day, with the exception of the taking the hills thing, went very well for the Confederates actually. They were in fact aggressive and drove the Union army out of their positions. In my opinion, it all hinged on the Hill issue, which was, at the time, not known to be of importance, until after the fact.


Hind sight is a great thing isn't it?

So this brings us back around to the question that Bob posed in the first place. Should the Confederates have gone to the right? Well, yes they should have, but they should have done it on the first day and then the nasty operation through the Devil's Den and Peach Orchard would not have been necessary.

 

[Hand Sword]

Agreed overall. But, the first day kind of just unfolded. The Confederates, and Lee taking some initiative, in a mass of confusion, fell into a victory. Once positions were assessed however, they should have re-deployed on day 2, and flanked the Grand Army of the Potomac.

 

[JasonASmith]

The whole Gettysburg campaign started well, but turned into a cluster very quickly...Jackson's death, the location of the battle, the absence of Stuart...all of these things contributed heavily...One of the things that people may miss when they read about the battle is the actual campaign itself...Lee wanted to get Harrisburg, and in fact shelled parts of Harrisburg before getting the intel to move south...
Also, the advance through Hanover and York to the Susquehanna river was going well until the Union burned the Susquehanna bridge and effectively cut them off from Philadelphia, which was one of the major targets to the raid...
I've often thought that Lee should have hammered the two flanks simultaneously(with a possible envelopment of the left flank) coupled with a vigorous artillery barrage from the front might have made a more significant effect on the third day, however Lee didn't know where the rest of the G.A.R. was...Either way, it's history...
By the by, the National Park Service is re-doing the Visitors Center(they are moving it away from the battlefield!) including a COMPLETE restoration of the Cyclorama(which is happening as we type)...I'm chomping at the bit to see the results.

 

[Hand Sword]

That was the plan on day 2, funny enough. Hood attacking one side, Longstreet the other, both at the same time. Which would've caused the center to weaken, sending reenforcements to both flanks. However, Longstreet didn't get engaged in battle until late day, close to evening time. It was the 1st time Longstreet had failed to follow Lee's orders.