From the footnotes of said case....
Plaintiffs have also construed the issues in this case as giving rise to "negligent performance of police duties." In an attempt to avoid the overwhelming case law barring private suits over negligent omissions in the performance of police duties, plaintiffs seek to bring this action within the orbit of cases allowing recovery for injuries caused by negligent acts of police officers in the performance of their official duties. The cases cited by plaintiffs include the negligent handling of a police dog, negligent operation of a police vehicle, and the negligent use of a police weapon. Such cases involve acts of affirmative negligence, for which anyone - police or civilian - would be liable: negligent handling of an attack dog, negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and negligent use of a firearm. Those acts of ordinary negligence do not change in character because they happen to have been committed by a police officer in the course of his duties. However, the allegations of negligence in the present case derive solely from defendants' status as police employees and from plaintiffs' contention that defendants failed to do what reasonably prudent police employees would have done in similar circumstances. The difference is between ordinary negligence on the one hand and a novel sort of professional malpractice on the other. A person does not, by becoming a police officer, insulate himself from any of the basic duties which everyone owes to other people, but neither does he assume any greater obligation to others individually. The only additional duty undertaken by accepting employment as a police officer is the duty owed to the public at large. The public duty concept has drawn some criticism for purportedly creating the rule that: "'Because we owe a duty to everybody, we owe it to nobody.'" Riss v. City of New York, supra at 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 901, 240 N.E.2d at 862 (Keating, J., dissenting). A duty owed to the public, however, is no less enforceable because it is owed to "everybody." Public officials at all levels remain accountable to the public and the public maintains elaborate mechanisms to enforce its rights - both formally in the courts and less formally through internal disciplinary proceedings. In the case of the Metropolitan Police Department, officers are subject to criminal charges and a penalty of two years imprisonment for failure to arrest law breakers. D.C.Code 1973, § 4-143. Additionally, officers are answerable to their superiors and ultimately to the public through its representatives, for dereliction in their assigned duties. D.C.Code 1973, § 4-121.
The absence of a duty specifically enforceable by individual members of the community is not peculiar to public police services. Our representative form of government is replete with duties owed to everyone in their capacity as citizens but not enforceable by anyone in his capacity as an individual. Through its representatives, the public creates community service; through its representatives, the public establishes the standards which it demands of its employees in carrying out those services and through its representatives, the public can most effectively enforce adherence to those standards of competence. As members of the general public, individuals forego any direct control over the conduct of public employees in the same manner that such individuals avoid any direct responsibility for compensating public employees.
Plaintiffs in this action would have the Court and a jury of twelve additional community representatives join in the responsibility of judging the adequacy of a public employee's performance in office. Plaintiffs' proposition would lead to results which the Massengill Court aptly described as "staggering." Massengill v. Yuma County, supra at 523, 456 P.2d at 381. In this case plaintiffs ask the Court and jury to arrogate to themselves the power to determine, for example, whether defendant Officer Thompson acted in a manner consistent with good police practice when he volunteered to stake out a suspect's house rather than volunteering to report to the crime scene. Consistent with this contention then, should a Court and jury also undertake to sift through clues known to the police in order to determine whether a criminal could reasonably have been apprehended before committing a second crime? Should a Court also be empowered to evaluate, in the context of a tort action, the handling of a major fire and determine whether the hoses were properly placed and the firemen correctly allocated? Might a Court also properly entertain a tort claim over a school teacher's ability to teach seventh grade English or over a postman's failure to deliver promptly an important piece of mail?
Establishment by the Court of a new, privately enforceable duty to use reasonable diligence in the performance of public functions would not likely improve services rendered to the public. The creation of direct, personal accountability between each government employee and every member of the community would effectively bring the business of government to a speedy halt, "would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible in the unflinching discharge of their duties,"[fn4a] and dispatch a new generation of litigants to the courthouse over grievances real and imagined. An enormous amount of public time and money would be consumed in litigation of private claims rather than in bettering the inadequate service which draws the complaints. Unable to pass the risk of litigation costs on to their "clients," prudent public employees would choose to leave public service. Although recognizing the obligation of public employees to perform their duties fully and adequately, the law property does not permit that obligation to be enforced in a private suit for money damages. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted and accordingly, the action is dismissed as to all defendants.
