Is anyone aware of the evolution of war? I'm specifically looking for the number of combatants as a function of time. I imagine "war" started as relatively small clans/families fighting, evolving over time into cities and states clashing. I'm interested in what would be considered a "large" battle at different stages of history. For instance, around 2000BC, would a conflict involving 10k be considered huge? How about 1000AD?
The early evolution of warfare
- Thread starter mrhnau
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Steel Tiger
Senior Master
The number of troops involved in battle has ebbed and flowed through history. Of course, one runs into the problem of inaccuracies in documentary evidence, whether from lack of real knowledge or propoganda.
The Egyptians appear to have fielded armies of thousands of men at times. If you accept Rameses the Greats claims about his campaigns then his army number somewhere between 5000 and 10000 men. But it is generally accepted that his claims are exaggerated.
Later, during the Classical Greek period we have very accurate figures for Greek armies from Herodotus and Thucidides. However, if Herodotus is to be believed regarding then Persians then they were fielding an army of about half a million. Most scholars agree that the actual force was more like 10 to 20 percent of this number. Herodotus was amplifying the threat to Greece posed by Persia. Later in the period, the time of the Pelopponesian War, armies were smaller. Gylippus invaded Sicily and besieged Syracuse with a force of about 5000, mostly raised in the Sicilian hinterland.
Alexander's armies of the Hellenistic period were large, about 10000 to 20000, but for the most part they were quite static. The infantry held the enemy while the cavalry swept the flanks and delivered a decisive blow to the rear. The Persian armies he faced were similarly large, larger, in fact, than his own force. Alexander's successors maintained the general pattern of his army but varied numbers depending on where they were and the level of outside threat.
Republican Rome had a base legion of 4800 men and generally put two into the field at a time, for a force of about 10000 men. The size of the legion increased in the late Republic to 5500 and later during the Imperial period to 6000. An Imperial legion, however, was always accompanied by a legion of auxilliaries. So when one reads of four legions taking the field, the writer is only referring to the regular troops. Thus four legions is not 23000 or so but more like 45000 to 50000. Big numbers!
Toward the end of the Empire this practise died out and a legion was not supported by auxilliaries in the same way. Roman armies set the tone for the Dark Ages and consequently armies were considered large at 5000 troops.
Around AD1000, the time of the Norman invasion of England. The same military pattern was still used. So the armies that met at Stamford Bridge and Hastings in 1066 were 5000 or less men.
I hope this potted view of history helps somewhat.
This is way out of my area, but I dimly recall some stuff from courses I took at university at one point on the anthropology of warfare. And there are some things I recall that might be germane to your question.
Violence and even raiding occurs in most societies, but the organized, coordination of activity for violence generally only starts when you have fixed, or at least periodically fixed, resources. Societies that have been described as not having socially organized violence, such as Inuit and northern Athapaskan societies in high N. American latitudes, or the Yaghan and Ono groups in Tierra del Fuego, exploited ecozones in which the distribution of game was randomized over large chunks of time. An intermediate situation occurs with predictable migratory resources, such as the North American bison, giving rise to the Plains battle culture; but even here, you don't have a dedicated social class supported by centrally collected surpluses who do nothing but fight. That development doesn't come in until the Neolithic period and the agricultural revolution. You don't get large scale war till you get farmers at the base of the food chain.
The most intense developments in warfare appear to have come from certain regionsthe Nile, Tigris/Eurphates, Indus and Chilean and Peruvian riverine systemswhere you had very high populations possible along with very limited territorial expansion available because the fertile ground was confined to often quite steep-sided valleys (as in Chile and Peru). Expanding populations lead to cycles of large-scale warfare, because population pressure makes it worthwhile to deflect a certain amount of production in support of full-time, professional armies. Each cycle of conquest produces a new underclass (the surviving losers of the cycle just completed); this certainly seems to have been the source of the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and S. American cultural horizons that eventually culminated in Pharonic Egypt, the Babylonian and Assyrian empires, Mohenjodaro and its satellites cities, and the Inca empire. In all these cases, as I recall, the key was large populations in very fertile but geographically severely confined regions. You get cycles of conquest, the rise of cities and city-states, specialized a warrior class (which eventually become just another profession) and, if things go on long enough, the growth of an empire.
Wish I could remember more of what we covered....
Violence and even raiding occurs in most societies, but the organized, coordination of activity for violence generally only starts when you have fixed, or at least periodically fixed, resources. Societies that have been described as not having socially organized violence, such as Inuit and northern Athapaskan societies in high N. American latitudes, or the Yaghan and Ono groups in Tierra del Fuego, exploited ecozones in which the distribution of game was randomized over large chunks of time. An intermediate situation occurs with predictable migratory resources, such as the North American bison, giving rise to the Plains battle culture; but even here, you don't have a dedicated social class supported by centrally collected surpluses who do nothing but fight. That development doesn't come in until the Neolithic period and the agricultural revolution. You don't get large scale war till you get farmers at the base of the food chain.
The most intense developments in warfare appear to have come from certain regionsthe Nile, Tigris/Eurphates, Indus and Chilean and Peruvian riverine systemswhere you had very high populations possible along with very limited territorial expansion available because the fertile ground was confined to often quite steep-sided valleys (as in Chile and Peru). Expanding populations lead to cycles of large-scale warfare, because population pressure makes it worthwhile to deflect a certain amount of production in support of full-time, professional armies. Each cycle of conquest produces a new underclass (the surviving losers of the cycle just completed); this certainly seems to have been the source of the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and S. American cultural horizons that eventually culminated in Pharonic Egypt, the Babylonian and Assyrian empires, Mohenjodaro and its satellites cities, and the Inca empire. In all these cases, as I recall, the key was large populations in very fertile but geographically severely confined regions. You get cycles of conquest, the rise of cities and city-states, specialized a warrior class (which eventually become just another profession) and, if things go on long enough, the growth of an empire.
Wish I could remember more of what we covered....
Interesting how those observations correspond to the waves of eastern nomads that moved into europe periodically (tartars, mongols, etc), they would certainly be considered "organized violence."
Yes, again, major population pressure—the Huns had apparently experienced a huge surge by the time they showed up to terrify Europe (not sure why)—but the thing is, on the broad open plains, you don't get that kind of cycle of state-building at successively greater layers of structure, because the losers can just move off. In the riverine valleys, you can't—it's all desert everywhere else (the Peruvian and Chilean river valleys are separated, so I've read, by the driest deserts on the planet). Ya just gotta take your lumps. So in those places, violence leads to the growth of cities and city-states and large-scale division of labor and social hierarchy.
Mind you, there are other processes going on as well; this is just some stuff I recall about the origins of agriculture, cities and systemic warfare as parts of a single cultural complex. It doesn't tell the whole story... Rome, for example...
Steel Tiger
Senior Master
There is a similar process with regard to the Mexican states. There were periodic movements of peoples, generally referred to as Chichimecs, from the "barbaric" northwestern deserts toward the Basin of Mexico. The Aztecs themselves were part of this migration pattern.
If I remember correctly, the Valley of Mexico presents an interesting variation on the basic theme I was referred to. The Valley is a kind of large-scale oasis in the midst of some fearsomely dry country. It's not a riverine ecosystem, with the concomittant highly desirable ultrafertile floodplain real estate, but it does have the crucial magical ingrediant: abundant clean water. Not rivers, but springs and lakes were the draw. But the effect was the same. Good observation, ST!
This thread is bringing back all kinds of memories of my happy undergraduate days, when I could take classes in all sorts of things and let my mind get pushed in a dozen different directions... in that class on the anthropology of conflict that I took, I wrote a paper that I haven't thought about for more than forty years till now. I think the title was something like `Vicious Cycles: the origins of Empires in constant warfare', and I remember that part of picking the title was to kind of sucker the reader into thinking I was going to be talking about blood feuds or something like that. But my idea was this: the basis for the growth of megastates like empires is a function of simple geometry. If you model the territory occupied by a State as a circle, the area of the circle, the `cycle' of my title, represents the land and resources controlled and exploited by the State—its assets; the circumference represents the frontiers of the state, which means, its points of vulnerability and the resource drain imposed by maintenance of its garrisons—in other words, its liabilities. Now the length of the circumference is 2?r, so as the radius of the state increases from r1 to r2, the increased drain on the resources of the state is linearly proportional to 2?(r2–r1). But the area increases in proportion to ?(r2ˆ2–r1ˆ2)—that is, in proportion, roughly speaking, to the square of the increase in the radius (yes, I know it's not (r2—r1)ˆ2, but it's the same order of magnitude). So your profits are going up at a rate which the square of your costs—not a bad deal, eh? So as long as resources flow from the area of the circle to the perimeter, things get better and better. States therefore have a built-in incentive to maintain more or less constant warfare; someone's profit is being maximized, whoever wins this particular round, eh?
But there's a catch: resources have to flow unimpeded to maintain the perimeter. If they're diverted, then the bottom line goes down, and eventually the radius has to start decreasing. In ancient Rome, for example, the cost of the gladitorial games eventually came to outweigh the expenditures on maintaining the perimeter... and we all know what happened.
I subsequently discovered that this same kind of model explains why animals in high latitudes are rewarded, in evolutionary terms, for increased size (which also explains why Ice Age mammals were way larger than their modern descendents, seemingly). But way back then, I'd only heard about age/area models in connection with accounts of why people adopt migratory lifestyles in preagricultural societies. My model of the growth of empires was sort of a mirror image of those age/area models, though I didn't realize it at the time...
Those were the days.... sigh....
But there's a catch: resources have to flow unimpeded to maintain the perimeter. If they're diverted, then the bottom line goes down, and eventually the radius has to start decreasing. In ancient Rome, for example, the cost of the gladitorial games eventually came to outweigh the expenditures on maintaining the perimeter... and we all know what happened.
I subsequently discovered that this same kind of model explains why animals in high latitudes are rewarded, in evolutionary terms, for increased size (which also explains why Ice Age mammals were way larger than their modern descendents, seemingly). But way back then, I'd only heard about age/area models in connection with accounts of why people adopt migratory lifestyles in preagricultural societies. My model of the growth of empires was sort of a mirror image of those age/area models, though I didn't realize it at the time...
Those were the days.... sigh....
Steel Tiger
Senior Master
This is an interesting point. The Aztec hegemonic state maintained enemy states within its apparent borders in order to go to war with them. The stated reason was for the Flower War, a sacred conflict in which each side attempted to cature, not kill, their enemies in order to use them in sacrifice rituals. A major effect of this was to give battle experience to new warriors. This was important because the Aztec army was constantly having to quell revolts among the provinces where the majority of the states resources came from.
As I recallafter 40+ years it's rather dim!the Aztec empire wasn't one that I appealed to in the model I offered in this paperjust as well, since I knew bugger-all about it, compared familiar examples of Old World empires. It occurs to me, though, that the Romans did something similar: a continuous supply of war prisoners was needed not for the divine-appeasement blood sacrifices of the Aztecs, but for the lumpenprole-appeasement blood rituals in the arenas of the Empire known as the Games, including but not restricted to staged battles to the death between pairs of gladiators. An absolutely enormous number of bodies were neededit wasn't just the Coloseum in Rome itself; there were hundreds of gaditorial games and horrific events featuring large scale public sadism throughout the empire in the final couple of centuries. That kind of use of military powerto procure victims for the Games, for public sacrifices etc.can be highly counterproductive, because it incurs huge costs and yields no strategic benefits or revenue sources that can be redirected into maintenance of the army. And as the Aztecs discovered, it creates a large number of really pissed-off tributary states ready to fall all over themselves collaborating with a foreign invader to destroy their indigenous oppressor...
Steel Tiger
Senior Master
Exactly! The Aztecs did suffer for this in another way. These powerful hostage states were to their east and south. To the west was the emerging and powerful state of the Tarascans. The border between them was one of the few instances of a fortified boundary in Mesoamerica. The Aztecs struggled to hold this border because they could not bring to bear the weight of numbers that would guarantee security.
Just to get back to the OP, the Aztec base unit numbered 8000 men, and the potential force they could field was about 160 000, though I don't think more thna 40 000 ever saw combat at once. There were significant problems with logistics and moving the force.
That's very interesting! I hadn't realized that the Tarascans were one of the problems the Aztecs faced on their own weakened frontiers...
The Valley of Mexico is a logistical horror show. All things considered, I think the topography of the respective regions made things a hell of a lot harder for the Aztecs than the Romans.
Steel Tiger
Senior Master
The Tarascans were the next rising power of Mexico. I firmly believe that if the Spaniards had not arrived the Aztecs would have fallen to the Tarascans. Just the wierd cycle of state development in Mexico.
One of the biggest problems, and a significant difference between the Aztecs and the Romans, was road construction. Roman armies built roads so that Roman armies could get places faster. Aztec armies, or the state for that matter, did not build roads. The paths and tracks that they used could take two or three men a breast at best, which means an 8000 man army would strung out over 5-6km once all of it was moving. As these armies rarely marched more than about 14km in a day, it is very likely thatthe rear of the force would not move out until the van had been marching for 2 to 3 hours.
I think a major problem for the development of Mexican warfare was the Basin. Fighting other states around the Basin was not so problematic, and huge alliances actually formed on each side of the lakes. It was when the same theory and strategy was applied beyond the Basin that problems began to arise.
One of the biggest problems, and a significant difference between the Aztecs and the Romans, was road construction. Roman armies built roads so that Roman armies could get places faster. Aztec armies, or the state for that matter, did not build roads. The paths and tracks that they used could take two or three men a breast at best, which means an 8000 man army would strung out over 5-6km once all of it was moving. As these armies rarely marched more than about 14km in a day, it is very likely thatthe rear of the force would not move out until the van had been marching for 2 to 3 hours.
I think a major problem for the development of Mexican warfare was the Basin. Fighting other states around the Basin was not so problematic, and huge alliances actually formed on each side of the lakes. It was when the same theory and strategy was applied beyond the Basin that problems began to arise.
This is part of what I was getting at at the end of my last message. Extending a network of roads very far beyond the Valley (or Basin) would have required engineering skills of a very high degree of sophistication, and expertise the Aztecs didn't possess because, unlike the Romans, there hadn't been a long line of Greek geniuses in Mesoamerica doing the fundamental mathematics that made Rome's engineering triumphs possible. A lot of the Roman Empire rested on the work of Archimedes, Nichomachus and Pythagoras, among many, many others.
Exactly. The country beyond the Basin is... well, fierce is the word that comes to mind. Transport and supply would have been nightmares for even the most efficient quartermasters.
In this respect, it's interesting to compare the Aztecs with the Inca—who were I think fully the equal of the Romans as empire builders and logistical problem-solvers, and ruled a comparably vast empire (though they had powerful enemies as well, a fact that isn't generally advertised...)
Steel Tiger
Senior Master
And yet they too did not built particularly useful roads. There is clearly a philosophy involved here that stems from the lack of large domestic animals as beasts of burden.
It is interesting to look at the Basin of Mexico and the Peruvian mountains and coast. There are a lot of similarites. They are harsh terrains indeed. It is, therefore, astounding to see how many large states arose in these areas. In the Basin, there are three major states with intermediate periods where there were many smaller states. Peru? There were at least five large states and who knows about any intermediate periods.
We're getting into areas that I'm very hazy on. But I seem to recall, from the tremendous past so to speak, that the Inca were a lot better than the Aztec in using the armies of `client'/subject states to enforce their rule at great distances. Instead of force-marching several score thousand troops to put down a rebellion a thousand miles from Cuzco, you had your compliant tributaries in the area do your dirty work. From what I recall, a lot of local rulers were glad to fall all over themselves doing The Inca's bidding, because that kept them assured of their own little bit of hegemony...
...not that different from the British Raj in India, when you come to think of it!
