Rosenberg's son admits dad's treason

[billc]

While he can't bring himself to admit his mother, as well as his father was a traitor, the son of Juluis and Ethel Rosenberg finally admits his father was a traitor. The article is at pajamasmedia.com.

http://pajamasmedia.com/ronradosh/2...nbergs-youngest-son-robert-what-does-it-mean/

From the article:

First, as John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev have revealed in Spies, Ethel Rosenberg was not only aware of the network her husband had put in place, she herself suggested that her brother David Greenglass be recruited by the KGB since he was stationed at Los Alamos. Second, and most importantly, Julius Rosenberg was not only aware of the Manhattan Project, he recruited a second atom spy, Russell McNutt, precisely because he thought that McNutt would be able to gather atomic bomb information from the plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

 

[granfire]

oh em gee....

I don't believe there is a huge disagreement over that.

However, the interesting point is that they were woefully unimportant, several other spies with more indepth knowledge outshone them in the information exchange, and they were unfairly railroaded.

And the motivation for most of the big spies was the moral compass that no single nation should hold the monopoly over such a terrible things as the Atom Bomb.

And while the cold war was not particular pleasant, an atomic winter would have been much more cumbersom.

 

[Big Don]

And the motivation for most of the big spies was the moral compass that no single nation should hold the monopoly over such a terrible things as the Atom Bomb.

So that makes TREASON OK?
There are four main reasons people commit treason: Money, Ideology, Conscience and Ego.
I think 90% come down to Ego, "Oh, those idiots will NEVER catch me..."

 

[granfire]

So that makes TREASON OK?
There are four main reasons people commit treason: Money, Ideology, Conscience and Ego.
I think 90% come down to Ego, "Oh, those idiots will NEVER catch me..."

Be glad there are scientists with a conscience...enough egg heads out there who lack the greater understanding of humanity. Or humility.

However I do not dare speculate on the motivation of every single person who gave up secret material important to the making of the Atomic bomb.

Look back on history and be glad that only 2 were used in earnest. The world could look much different now, and God only knows if that could be a good thing.

There are enough people out there who think the 'nuke them' is a feasable response to the problems of the world. Consider the scenario id such could be done without the fear of like retaliation!

 

[Bruno@MT]

There are several things here which

1) I think they were ideologists who thought the nuclear bomb should not belong to 1 nation. In that regard, they were right.
2) They were still traitors. Though I thought the death penalty was only applicable in wartime?
3) They did not make much of a difference, ironically.
4) I think they were thrown under the bus as a distraction attempt.
5) Many exceptionally bright people suck at judging things outside of their field of expertise. The fact that they did not expect to get caught is testament to that, in the same way that Hans Reiser thought he would get away with murdering his wife.

Personally I think the cold war was the best thing to ever happen. Given how we as a race suck at living peacefully together for humanitarian reasons, we were forced to not destroy each other because that game would have left no winners. If I had had the chance to work on nuclear weapons, I'd have taken it. I considered majoring in nuclear physics, but my country does not develop or have nukes, and the nuclear industry was already looking shaky. Had I lived in a nuke nation I would have tried to become a nuke scientist.

 

[billc]

Giving the most dangerous weapons on the planet to one of the greatest mass murdering nations on the planet was insane. If they had given the weapon info. to Britain or one of the western democracies, the idea of not wanting just one country to have those weapons is a little closer to being okay, but to the Soviet Union? That would be like saying that the neighbor down the street, owns a gun, so I am going to give a gun to the serial killer down the street.

 

[granfire]

Giving the most dangerous weapons on the planet to one of the greatest mass murdering nations on the planet was insane. If they had given the weapon info. to Britain or one of the western democracies, the idea of not wanting just one country to have those weapons is a little closer to being okay, but to the Soviet Union? That would be like saying that the neighbor down the street, owns a gun, so I am going to give a gun to the serial killer down the street.

Somebody tell billi about the trail of tears....no nation is above reproach.

 

[Bruno@MT]

Giving the most dangerous weapons on the planet to one of the greatest mass murdering nations on the planet was insane. If they had given the weapon info. to Britain or one of the western democracies, the idea of not wanting just one country to have those weapons is a little closer to being okay, but to the Soviet Union? That would be like saying that the neighbor down the street, owns a gun, so I am going to give a gun to the serial killer down the street.

Perhaps, but 2 allies sharing the weapon would not protect people from other side.
The only way for the stalemate to exist is if all major parties have the bomb. And whether they are murderous or not, you must not forget that they still could not use them without getting vaporized themselves. After all, they didn't, did they? That is the beauty of nukes. Noone can fire the first shot and expect to live.

Had only the US and their direct allies had the bomb, it is likely they would have ganged up on russia and china in order to get global dominance. I mean, looking at what the US did from the 50s to the 80s, you can't really say that they hesitate to cause mayhem just to further their goals. I think it is a good thing they (and the alliance) didn't have a monopoly on nukes.

All superpowers need someone as a counterweight.

 

[billc]

Yes, I'll say it. I guess one could say that you should make sure street gangs are all well armed as well?

 

[Blade96]

one of the greatest mass murdering nations on the planet was insane. If they had given the weapon info. to Britain or one of the western democracies, the idea of not wanting just one country to have those weapons is a little closer to being okay, but to the Soviet Union? That would be like saying that the neighbor down the street, owns a gun, so I am going to give a gun to the serial killer down the street.

George F Kennan once thought the same thing. That the USSR was like Hitler and couldnt be trusted.

He retracted his beliefs as an old man and said that the Korean war, Vietnam war, all of it - could have been avoided.

guess who was the only nation to ever use the atomic bomb? it wasnt the ussr.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_F._Kennan

 

[billc]

Dropped it to save lives, especially civillian lives, to avoid the nightmare of a beach landing in Japan. Japanese military types have stated, had they had the bomb, it would have been constantly used.

 

[granfire]

Dropped it to save lives, especially civillian lives, to avoid the nightmare of a beach landing in Japan. Japanese military types have stated, had they had the bomb, it would have been constantly used.

The first one was a tough decision, the 2nd came easier yet...care to venture down that road?

 

[MA-Caver]

To me... this is just closing the barn door.

 

[elder999]

Dropped it to save lives, especially civillian lives, to avoid the nightmare of a beach landing in Japan. Japanese military types have stated, had they had the bomb, it would have been constantly used.

If you look closely at the history, odds are good that Japan would have surrendered before we had to invade-this was not known to all, and kept from some who made policy.


More to the point, having spoken directly with some of the people involved at the time who were still alive 15 years ago, and seen some of the correspondence involved, I can state-strictly as my own, well-informed opinion-that we dropped the bombs on Japan for one principle, over-riding reason:

Because we could.

in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380

the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.

MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.

 

[billc]

Well Elder, the internet is a great tool, an article from the weekly standard about the released intelligence reports on Japan and the end of world war 2 which supports Truman's decision to drop the bombs, and countering the "japan was ready to surrender anyway," argument.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?page=2

from the article:

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government...

An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled...

The conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign Minister Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato emerges in the intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking for history the feebleness of the whole enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The foreign minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to know whether the government and the military supported the overture and what its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese position, adopted in an Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to the finish. The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end the war, otherwise the effort could not be taken seriously. Togo responded evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had authorized the effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had been replaced. Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

This last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly that both Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the government) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee that the Imperial Institution would not be eliminated could prove essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have surrendered. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato promptly wired back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made clear to American policymakers "advocate unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply, quoted in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, was adamant: American policymakers could read for themselves Togo's rejection of Sato's proposal--with not even a hint that a guarantee of the Imperial House would be a step in the right direction. Any rational person following this exchange would conclude that modifying the demand for unconditional surrender to include a promise to preserve the Imperial House would not secure Japan's surrender.

Togo's initial messages--indicating that the emperor himself endorsed the effort to secure Soviet mediation and was prepared to send his own special envoy--elicited immediate attention from the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, as well as Under Secretary of State Grew. Because of Grew's documented advice to Truman on the importance of the Imperial Institution, critics feature him in the role of the sage counsel. What the intercept evidence discloses is that Grew reviewed the Japanese effort and concurred with the U.S. Army's chief of intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell, that the effort most likely represented a ploy to play on American war weariness. They deemed the possibility that it manifested a serious effort by the emperor to end the war "remote." Lest there be any doubt about Grew's mindset, as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew drafted a memorandum with an oblique reference to radio intelligence again affirming his view that Tokyo still was not close to peace....

Starting with the publication of excerpts from the diaries of James Forrestal in 1951, the contents of a few of the diplomatic intercepts were revealed, and for decades the critics focused on these. But the release of the complete (unredacted) "Magic" Far East Summary, supplementing the Diplomatic Summary, in the 1990s revealed that the diplomatic messages amounted to a mere trickle by comparison with the torrent of military intercepts. The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender.
Ultra was even more alarming in what it revealed about Japanese knowledge of American military plans. Intercepts demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic). American planning for the Kyushu assault reflected adherence to the military rule of thumb that the attacker should outnumber the defender at least three to one to assure success at a reasonable cost. American estimates projected that on the date of the landings, the Japanese would have only three of their six field divisions on all of Kyushu in the southern target area where nine American divisions would push ashore. The estimates allowed that the Japanese would possess just 2,500 to 3,000 planes total throughout Japan to face Olympic. American aerial strength would be over four times greater.

From mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory."

Concurrent with the publication of the radio intelligence material, additional papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been released in the last decade. From these, it is clear that there was no true consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an invasion of Japan. The Army, led by General George C. Marshall, believed that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was time. Thus, Marshall and the Army advocated an invasion of the Home Islands as the fastest way to end the war. But the long-held Navy view was that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was casualties. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be far too costly to sustain the support of the American people, and hence believed that blockade and bombardment were the sound course.

 

[elder999]

Well Elder, the internet is a great tool, an article from the weekly standard about the released intelligence reports on Japan and the end of world war 2 which supports Truman's decision to drop the bombs, and countering the "japan was ready to surrender anyway," argument.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?page=2

from the article:

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government...

Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.

Japan's Navy was destroyed. They had no airforce. They had been defeated at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The sticking point was the Potsdam Declaration's-and the Allies's-insistence on unconditional surrender, which, to the Japanese, meant the loss of the Emperor, and it was for this that many-especially the dominant militarists-were sticking for. As it was, even after dropping the bombs, what we got was a conditional surrender, with retention of the Emperor.

It was not necessary to drop the bomb, I'll take the word of a good old conservative icon, and general, like Ike over anyone else on this.

 

[billc]

continuing:

The picture becomes even more complex than previously understood because it emerged that the Navy chose to postpone a final showdown over these two strategies. The commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Admiral Ernest King, informed his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 that he did not agree that Japan should be invaded. He concurred only that the Joint Chiefs must issue an invasion order immediately to create that option for the fall. But King predicted that the Joint Chiefs would revisit the issue of whether an invasion was wise in August or September. Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in strict confidence.
In August, the Ultra revelations propelled the Army and Navy towards a showdown over the invasion. On August 7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.)
On August 9 (the day the second bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki), King gathered the two messages in the exchange between Marshall and MacArthur and sent them to Nimitz. King told Nimitz to provide his views on the viability of invading Kyushu, with a copy to MacArthur. Clearly, nothing that had transpired since May would have altered Nimitz's view that Olympic was unwise. Ultra now made the invasion appear foolhardy to everyone but MacArthur. But King had not placed a deadline on Nimitz's response, and the Japanese surrender on August 15 allowed Nimitz to avoid starting what was certain to be one of the most tumultuous interservice battles of the whole war.

 

[billc]

Highlights from the article:

Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in strict confidence.

and about McCarther:

. On August 7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.)

also:

What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance.
Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated. The maneuver further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that killed 17 million.

 

[billc]

From the article above: another reason to drop the bombs

This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations

 

[billc]

Finally, the arguments against dropping the bombs and why they were wrong:

From the article:

With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance.


There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.